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Balter: The Role of the Adviser in a Tax Investigation with Fraud Overton

THE ROLE OF THE ADVISER IN A
TAX INVESTIGATION WITH FRAUD OVERTONES:
ANALYSIS OF THE "COOPERATION" PROBLEM*
HARRY GRAHAM BALTER**

To counsel representing a taxpayer who is audited by the Internal Revenue
Service and who, because of previous actions, may either initially or at some
later time have to confront the possibility of an investigation for criminal tax
fraud, the question whether to cooperate with the Service is a critical one. The
difficult choice that faces the taxpayer and his counsel in such a situation has
been frequently referred to in opinions in tax fraud cases,' and his dilemma
has been described in this manner:
If he refuses to cooperate and remains silent, the taxpayer runs the risk
of having incorrect inferences drawn from whatever facts the agents
discover; and his attitude certainly does not lessen the suspicion. On the
other hand, if he cooperates and converses freely with skilled investigators, he may be, and usually is, furnishing evidence for use against himself in a subsequent criminal prosecution.2
*This article is essentially Chapter Six of the Fourth edition of Mr. Baiter's book, Tax
Fraud and Evasion, soon to be published by Warren, Gorham & Lamont, Inc., of Boston.
Minor modifications were made to adapt the chapter to article presentation. The adaptation
was accomplished by Karla Simon, J.D. 1972, Duke University, recently a teaching consultant
at the University of Florida, with the assistance of Robert Eisen, J.D. 1974, LL.M. 1975,
University of Florida. They assume full responsibility for minor variations from the sixth
chapter of the fourth edition of Tax Fraud and Evasion.
Permission to reprint any part of this article must be obtained from Warren, Gorham &
Lamont, Inc., holder of the copyright to the fourth edition of Tax Fraudand Evasion.
**B.A. 1924, J.D. 1926, University of California at Berkeley. Member, State Bar of California.
1. "Moreover, the prosecution may pick and choose from the taxpayer's statement, relying on the favorable portion and throwing aside that which does not bolster its position."
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 128-29, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. 9714, at 46,961 (1954). "Unfortunately, for the defendant's position that, because of the method of proof employed,
legal evidence is lacking upon which to find him guilty, his willingness to cooperate with
the government agents in their many conferences and discussions with him on the theory, as
he claims, that he was of the opinion that, instead of laying a predicate to judge him out of
his own mouth, he and they were trying to correctly ascertain and straighten his tax liability out, stands strongly in his way. For it has placed him in the position of making many
statements to which the government can and does point as admissions in support of their
theory, with the result that, everything considered, it may not be said as matter of law that
the record is wholly without evidence to support the verdict." Demetree v. United States,
207 F.2d 892, 894, 1953-2 U.S.T.C. ff9646, at 48,772 (5th Cir. 1953). "And herein is the
anomaly of the case. When the defendant reveals facts, in conversation or through his acts,
they are either used against him, if unfavorable to him, or discounted, if favorable. And if
he is silent his failure to make full disclosure is urged as an admission of guilt." United
States v. Clark, 123 F. Supp. 608, 616, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. f19546, at 46,437 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
2. Vloutis v. United States, 219 F.2d 782, 787, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. D19262, at 54,565 (5th Cir.
1955).
[914]
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The choice is made more difficult because the usual practice in ordinary
civil tax audits in which no fraud element is involved is "across-the-board"
cooperation with the revenue agents. Such a practice normally is advisable in
order to effect an early administrative disposition of the matter and to eliminate unnecessary conflicts regarding facts.3 A refusal to cooperate by the taxpayer under investigation in a nonfraud audit would not afford him any real
advantage since an administrative summons could commandeer the taxpayer's
4
books and records as well as subject him to oral examination.
It is clear that where the taxpayer knows criminal charges may be in issue,
he has the right under the fifth amendment to refuse to submit his personal
books and records for examination or to discuss the facts with the investigators.5 The crucial and transcendent problems for the practitioner are: (1) to
be able to recognize whether there is danger of criminal action against the
taxpayer; (2) to be able to recognize this at a sufficiently early stage of the investigation to be of maximum use to the taxpayer; and (8) to be able to determine whether he should advise the taxpayer to exercise his right to refuse
to cooperate by not making his books and records available or discussing the
facts of the case with the investigators.6
3. Olsen, The Revenue Agent Reacts to the Taxpayer and His Representative, N. Y. U.
12m INsr. ON FED. TAx. 1001 (1954). See also 1 L. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACrIcE §3.14 (1955).
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§7602-05. A §7602 summons may not be used where the sole

objective of the examination is to obtain evidence for use against the taxpayer in a criminal prosecution. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19173 (1971);
Reisman v. Caplan, 375 U.S. 440, 1964-1 U.S.T.C. f19202 (1964). However, the summons may
be used for the dual purpose of determining civil tax liability and investigating possible
criminal violations providing: "[I]t is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation
for criminal prosecution." Donaldson v. United States, supra at 536, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. at
85,765. Whether a §7602 summons issued during a joint civil and criminal tax investigation
meets the Donaldson standard has proved a difficult determination for the lower federal
courts. Compare United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 19280
(6th Cir. 1973), with United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19781 (S.D.
Ohio 1973). Compare United States v. Oaks, 360 F. Supp. 855, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 19745 (C.D.
Cal. 1973), with United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 19649 (9th Cir. 1971). See
generally Stafford 8: Jackson, The Privilege Against Self Incrimination in Federal Tax Investigations, 34 LA. L. REv. 703, 731-36 (1974); Note, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations:
Limitations on the Scope of the Section 7602 Summons, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 114 (1972).
5. U.S. CONsr. amend. V, states inter alia: "No person shall be compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself." The taxpayer's books, records, and oral or documentary statements are protected by this privilege. Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974),
and the cases cited therein. The privilege protects an individual from compulsory self-

incrimination. Thus, to assert the privilege there must be some type of governmental compulsion to testify, such as a contempt proceeding for refusal to testify, and the testimony or
records sought must tend to incriminate the person compelled to testify. C. MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §§120-25 (2d ed. 1972). See Stafford &Jackson, supranote 4, at 707-10.
The reader should be aware, however, of the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions
narrowing the protective ambit of the fifth amendment, even as to taxpayers who conduct
their business or profession in noncorporate form. See, e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S.
85 (1974) (privilege denied to business records of 3-man law partnership); United States v.
Fisher, 500 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1974).
6. The decision whether to cooperate is pervasive; it may affect not only the conclusions
and recommendations of the investigating agents, but the effect of this decision may reap-
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It is difficult enough for a practitioner to evaluate the potentials of a situation in order to make the decision whether to cooperate. It is sheer misfortune
when the opportunity to make the decision intelligently has already been
foreclosed by the actions of the taxpayer, with or without the help of an informed or uninformed "adviser," be he lawyer, accountant, or lay friend. Examples are, of course, legion where tragic consequences - for example, prosecution with the taxpayer having provided the case against himself - have followed a taxpayer's misguided course of action.7 The reasons why a taxpayer
may have cooperated to his detriment may be summarized as follows:
(1) a natural inclination not to "buck" the federal agents;
(2) lack of knowledge of his rights under the Constitution;
(3) reluctance to expend money to employ competent advisers on the
supposition that "it won't do any good anyway"; 8
(4) willingness to rely for advice on the "run-of-the-mill" accountant or
lawyer with whom he is in normal contact, not realizing how damaging inexpert advice may be to his best interests;
(5) fear that if he hires someone who has a reputation in the tax fraud
field, the investigators will assume that he must be guilty of fraud or he
would not have found it necessary to employ an expert;
(6) a feeling, usually unwarranted, that if he cooperates, the agents will
not recommend criminal action.
For the situation that is still salvageable, that is, where the practitioner still
has the opportunity to determine whether and to what extent to advise cooperation, this article attempts to indicate some guidelines on the cooperation
question with regard to individual taxpayers.9
No pretense is made that there are omnibus guides that will govern all
situations. Each case, of course, presents its own peculiar problems. But there
are recurring patterns, both in taxpayer machinations and conduct and in
Treasury investigative procedures and techniques. Close study of these patterns, with a sampling of the views and thinking of competent tax practitioners, results in a conviction that if certain basic guides are followed by the adviser, he will avoid the most hazardous pitfalls in the shepherding of his client
through the criticial investigation period.' 0
pear in subsequent phases of the case, including the reviewing process, the trial, and even
the sentencing. See text accompanying notes 27-51 infra.
7. E.g., United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 1968-2 U.S.T.C. 19461 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Cymbala, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. 19457 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); cases cited note I supra.
8. There is a maxim among tax experts that the taxpayer who is first to keep his just
taxes from the Treasury is also the type who is loath to part with money to counsel.
9. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is personal; thus an individual
cannot utilize the fifth amendment to shield the books and records of an entity such as a
corporation, unincorporated association, union, or partnership that he may hold in a representative capacity even though they tend to incriminate him. Bellis v. United States, 94
S. Ct. 2179, 2182-83 (1974) (partnership); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699-700 (1944)

(union); Wright v. Detwiler, 241 F. Supp. 753, 1965-2 U.S.T.C. 9605 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (corporation).
10. For collateral reading on the question of cooperation generally, see Arent, Mr.
Borderline Relies on his Constitutional Rights, in ABA SECTION OF TAXATION, TAx FRAUD
CASES, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 117 (1951); Arent, The Private Practitioner's Approach to
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As soon as the taxpayer learns, either through direct contact or through
others, that his return has been assigned for examination, it is important for
the taxpayer and his adviser to find out who is assigned to make the investigation. Under no circumstances should any cooperation be given or admission
made by the taxpayer until the identity of the investigator has been determined, since the identity of the agent will frequently indicate the type of investigation being conducted. Is it a routine audit by a revenue agent? Has the
return been assigned to a revenue agent working out of a so-called "fraud
squad" or some similar group in the Audit Division of the District Director's
office? Is the revenue agent working with a special agent of the Intelligence
Division attached to the office of the District Director, or is the investigating
agent a special agent and has he so identified himself?11
Once the practitioner knows the nature of the investigation or at least is
able to make a reasonable guess as to whether fraud elements may be involvedl,
the decision whether to cooperate becomes more focused. One cardinal rule
that the practitioner must follow is never to enter into an audit that has
fraud overtones with the idea that the revenue agent can be outsmarted. To
underestimate the opposition is probably the most tragic error that can be
made by the taxpayer or his adviser. It is far better to assume that the investigators know their business, that they are well-trained, and that they will try
to be as fair as possible, consistent with their duty.12
Fraud Cases, in 3 Am. UNrv. TAX. INsT. LEcrumS, CURRENT ISSUES IN FED. TAX. (1951);
Avarian, Mr. Borderline Cooperates with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in ABA SEcrsoN
OF TAXATION, TAx FRAUD CASTS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 99 (1951); Baiter, Tax Adviser's
Evaluation of Legal and Practical Factors Determining Decisions During a Fraud Investigation, U. So. CAL. 1952 TAX INST. 381; Baiter, Should Your Client "Cooperate" When Charged
with Tax Fraud?,29 TAXES 290 (1951); Baradel, How the PractitionerShould Prepare for a
Fraud Examination, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON Fa. TAX. 57, 64 (1954); Boxleitner, The Handling
of Tax Fraud Cases: Practical Considerations (pt. 2), 2 PRAc. LAW. §5, at 30, 38-40 (1956);
Donaldson, The Commission's Enforcement Policies, in Tax Fraud ch. 8 (Mich. Inst. Continuing Legal Educ., 1973); Platt, Cooperation Versus Non-Cooperation in Tax Fraud Cases,
N.Y.U. 10H INST. ON FED. TAX. 1305 (1952).
11. There is no obligation on the part of a revenue agent to disclose that the focus of
the investigation has changed from "civil" to possible "criminal," nor is there any obligation
on the part of a special agent to warn the taxpayer that he is working with a revenue agent
on the case and that there is a possibility of a "criminal" recommendation until the point
is reached where the special agent decides to approach the taxpayer in person. Only when
the special agent discusses the situation with the taxpayer himself is there an obligation on
the part of the special agent not only to identify himself, but to warn the taxpayer of his
constitutional rights that he need say nothing, that he need not turn over his books and
records, and that he may seek the advice of counsel if he so wishes. Lipton, Safeguarding
Constitutional Rights in Tax Fraud Investigations, 32 TAxEs 363 (1954); Annot., 37 TAXES
736 (1959), citing an article by Leslie Wald, Esq. in the May 1959 W. Bus. Rxv.
12. The Internal Revenue Manual describes various procedures that are used by agents
in carrying out their investigations. Very frequently these tactics disarm taxpayers and lead
to their making ill-advised comments that aid the agents in developing their case. Fienschreiber, Analysis of the Four Methods the IRS Uses to Redetermine a Taxpayer's Income,
11 TAX FOR AccouNTANTs 84 (1973), discusses various approaches suggested in the Internal
Revenue Manual for revenue agents to use in reconstructing a taxpayer's income by indirect methods. Agents are instructed to "establish a rapport with the taxpayer" and "in a
friendly affable manner" to "establish the confidence of the taxpayer" and to "keep the
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The practitioner must not assume that he will overwhelm the investigator
with some "novel" explanation of irregularities that may sound plausible to
him. The chances are that the agent has heard the story many times before.
"Blaming it on the bookkeeper" and "money left in a strong box, earned or
received before the tax years in question," are merely two of many explanations that the investigators have heard time and time again.
Another important factor to take into account is that usually time is not
of the essence. The adviser may take a reasonable time to check intensively the
facts and the law. The investigators will exert constant pressure on the taxpayer and his adviser for information on this or that subject, but if the adviser courteously yet firmly informs them that he needs additional time within
which to do his own investigation (the Government usually has had an advantageous start on him) before he can reach a decision whether to comply
with their requests, no unfavorable reaction will result. 13 As a knowledgeable
practitioner has said: "Do not plunge in guessing and groping, taking a position on cooperation or noncooperation; instead, preserve the status quo without taking any irreversible steps in any direction, pending competent scrutiny
of the case.'

14

If conditions were ideal, the decision whether to cooperate would be made
after the expert has made an exhaustive study of the taxpayer's situation with
conversation informal and easy": the objective of this directive is to elicit information about
the taxpayer's family, vacations, gambling, hobbies, acquisition of unusual assets, and other
expenditures to ascertain whether "the taxpayer is living beyond his reported income." The
reason for the friendly approach is that during the initial interview the taxpayer may answer
more honestly because he does not know why the questions are asked. Form 4822 is a special
form to be used by the agent to record this information. "The manual states that 'we
strongly emphasize making the initial contact with the taxpayer, not with his representative.'
The stated justification for this approach is that accountants and attorneys engage in 'dilatory
the agent is instructed to establish a rapport with the taxor delaying tactics.' Also ....
payer to give the taxpayer a false sense of security as a means of obtaining information that
would not otherwise be revealed. These two factors, taken together, can be read as instructing the agent to contact the taxpayer directly to discourage the taxpayer from utilizing
the accountant's or attorney's advice. This approach denies the taxpayer effective representation in many circumstances." Id. at 86. See United States v. Mackiewicz, 401 F.2d 219, 1968-2
U.S.T.C. f[9461 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Cymbala, 1969-2 U.S.T.C. f19457 (E.D.N.Y.
1969). Gymbala is another in a long series of examples where the taxpayer "cooperated" with
the revenue agent, believing that he could "explain" all problems, even those pointed out
by the revenue agent. Then, after the revenue agent recommended a full-scale fraud investigation by the Intelligence Division and a special agent came into the case, it was almost too late for the taxpayer to stop "cooperating" because he had already put the nails
in his coffin. As the court said, quoting from Mackiewicz: "To some extent a taxpayer must
watch out for himself." Id. at 85.086. See Baradel, supra note 10, for valuable suggestions for
placing the taxpayer-agent relationship on a sound basis.
13. For an informative discussion of the methodology in this respect, see Groman, Tax
Fraudsand Voluntary Disclosures, U. So. CAL. 1948 TAX INST. 383, 384-85.
14. Annot., 37 TAXES' 736, 737 (1959), citing an article by Leslie H. Wald, Esq., in the
May 1959 IV. Bus. Rev. As to how to preserve the status quo, Mr. Wald recommends:
"[F]irst, that all contact between the taxpayer and the agent be put off; second, that all
contact between the taxpayer and his accountant be cut off (since such communications are
not privileged); and, third, that all books and records belonging to the taxpayer be immediately put in the hands of the taxpayer or his counsel." Annot., supra at 737.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 2

19751

ADVISER IN TAX FRAUD CASES

respect to both the facts and the law. Only then would the adviser be in a
position intelligently to make the decision regarding cooperation. What is
unfortunate for the taxpayer and his adviser is that the decision must sometimes be made, perhaps irrevocably, at such an early stage of the investigation
that neither the taxpayer nor his adviser has had the opportunity to fully
appraise the entire situation and to calculate the eventual risks involved in
adopting one course or another. In a real sense, the adviser is called upon to
telescope within a short span of time the taxpayer's entire case, with all its
legal and factual ramifications.
As a minimum preparation for making a decision on cooperation, it is
suggested that the adviser should interrogate the client regarding:
(1) the tax years involved;
(2) the method or methods by which the taxable income was understated or unallowable deductions came about;
(3) the records kept by the taxpayer in the years involved;
(4) the personnel who kept the records;
(5) the disposition of the unreported income;
(6) whether the client had any disgruntled or discharged employees or
business enemies who had access to his books and records or were familiar
with his business transactions;(7) whether the client has ever gone through bankruptcy;16
15. The Commissioner may pay informers up to 10 percent of the entire amount collected by the Treasury as the result of information supplied against a taxpayer. INr. Rxv.
CODE OF 1954, §7623; TREAs. REG. §301.7623-1(c). For examples of former employees of taxpayers informing the Intelligence Division of possible tax evasion, see VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 19825 (9th Cir. 1974); Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144,
1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19415 (7th Cir. 1971); Shaffer v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 554, 1974-2 U.S.T.C.
19831 (D. Colo. 1974).
16. The essential elements of a criminal tax evasion case are an amount of tax due and
a wilful attempt to evade. INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, §7201, and cases cited note 38 infra. To
establish an additional amount of tax due, the government must prove that the actual
taxable income for a given year exceeded reported taxable income. Many successful criminal
prosecutions have utilized the net worth, cash expenditure, or bank deposit methods of
proving taxable income. These methods, although circumstantial in nature, are well established in criminal tax prosecutions. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 1954-2 U.S.T.C.
19714 (1954) (net worth); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 1943-1 U.S.T.C. 19470
(1943) (cash expenditure); Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394, 1935-2 U.S.T.C. 19645
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 709 (1935) (bank deposit).
Under the net worth method the government establishes the net worth of the taxpayer
at the beginning and end of the tax year. The difference between the two figures is adjusted for nondeductible and nontaxable items and the result is taxable income for the year.
The taxpayer's net worth is the difference between his assets and liabilities. The key figure
is, of course, the beginning or opening net worth from which all future increases are determined. The government must establish this figure with reasonable certainty and must
follow up on leads given by the taxpayer that, if true, would establish the taxpayer's in-

nocence. Such a lead could be the existence of a large cache of currency on hand at the
beginning of the period and not included in the opening net worth. The government must
also show that the net worth increase is attributable to currently taxable income or negate
all non-taxable sources for the increase. United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595, 1958-1 U.S.T.C.
19326 (1958); Holland v. United States, supra. Obviously, a bankruptcy could be the perfect
basis for the opening net worth in a net worth case.
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(8) whether the client has ever been investigated by other agencies of
the federal government,
and whether he has been involved in any sort of
17
criminal activity;
(9) whether the client's books are being checked in connection with an
investigation of some other taxpayer's returns;
(10) the taxpayer's age, health, family status, position in the community,
occupation, previous criminal record, if any, education, and other biographical data.
Although these matters are generally of little influence, in some cases a favorable combination of them may tip the scales against prosecution.' 8
Very similar to the net worth method is the cash expenditures method, where the
government compares reported income with the taxpayer's expenditures for a given year.
If the expenditures, adjusted for nontaxable and nondeductible items, exceed reported income, then it may be inferred that the difference is unreported income. As with the net
worth method, the government must establish a beginning net worth with reasonable certainty, track down taxpayer leads, and demonstrate that the unreported expenditures are
from taxable sources. This method is usually employed where the taxpayer spends his income on lavish living and has little net worth. United States v. Johnson, supra; McFee v.
United States, 206 F.2d 872, 1953-2 U.S.T.C. 19549 (9th Cir. 1953).
Under the bank deposit melhod the government totals the taxpayer's bank deposits, adjusts for nonincome items and deductions, and compares the result to reported income. The
difference is unreported income. In addition, the government must establish that the taxpayer was engaged in a lucrative calling or business producing currently taxable income
and that the account was under his dominion and control; it must also check out reasonable
leads. United States v. Rifkin, 451 F.2d 1149, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 19751 (2d Cir. 1971); Gleckman
v. United States, supra.
17. Frequently a federal or state investigation is followed by a tax inquiry. Other types
of criminal prosecutions often give rise to a tax fraud case. For example, some physicians
have found that a state prosecution for performing illegal operations has been speedily succeeded by a tax fraud investigation; other examples are too numerous to cite.
18. Some of the steps outlined were suggested by Groman, supra note 13. Similar
caveats as to thorough and complete preparation of the case before making the decision
whether to cooperate have been suggested by others. See, e.g., Baradel, supra note 10, at 67;
Cutler, Though New Cases Limit IRS, Civil Fraud Defense is Still a Formidable Task, 12
J. TAXATION 276 (1960). Mr. Cutler suggests further:
"As soon as a taxpayer becomes aware of a fraud investigation, it is of the utmost importance that his counsel forthwith commence a careful analysis of the taxpayer's case. What
should the taxpayer's counsel analyze? This depends on the information the Special Agent
discloses. Sometimes the Special Agent will advise the taxpayer's representative of the area
where the alleged fraud exists, sometimes in great detail. Other Special Agents may be reluctant to disclose any part of the case, in which event the taxpayer may suffer a handicap.
By and large, however, the taxpayer's counsel should make an exhaustive analysis of the
taxpayer's income. The probability is that taxpayer's counsel is in no worse position than
the examining officers and more likely than not he is in a better position.
"Before the taxpayer's counsel discusses the case in any of its phases with the Government representatives he should complete his analysis. He should examine all possible witnesses, should collect together all necessary documents, and should be thoroughly conversant with every fact and all the law related thereto. When he has collected all of this
material he should then prepare a memorandum on the case. This preparation should be as
complete as if getting ready for trial. When taxpayer's counsel has in this manner finished
his analysis, he will know the strength as well as the weaknesses of the case. Then and then
only can he effectively discuss the case with the Government representatives.
"Such thorough preparation should certainly be made if the case is under criminal con-
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In determining whether cooperation is advisable in a particular case, it is
important to bear in mind that cooperation is not an "all or nothing" proposition: "cooperation" does not mean a servile and obsequious compliance with
every request made by the investigator. Neither should it negate the taxpayer's
intelligent regard for his own interests. A taxpayer who permits free examination and audit of his books and records but refuses to sign a statement under
oath or submit to a searching interrogation by special agents should not be
labeled "uncooperative." Nor is a taxpayer necessarily "uncooperative" if he
permits an examination of his books and records but refuses to prepare a net
worth statement that might, in effect, hand the investigator a potentially
lethal weapon. There is a point at which cooperation should cease and selfinterest should begin. There are degrees of cooperation; it may be of a limited
or selective nature, depending on the circumstances of each case.
There are certain matters at a local level that any competent investigator
can discover simply by spending the time and effort necessary. A few examples
are: bank deposits in the name of the taxpayer or members of his immediate
family; purchases of insurance policies; purchases or sales of real estate; stock
brokerage transactions; and receipt of salaries. If these items are of record in
the name of the taxpayer or members of his immediate family, it is good
strategy to offer the agent this information; a policy of noncooperation in this
area would not keep this information from the agent.
The adviser's decision as to cooperation must also be influenced by the
exto
the
prior
tent to which the taxpayer already has disclosed vital information
time that the adviser is called into the case. Obviously, if damaging data have
already been turned over, or if the taxpayer has already made a complete
statement to the investigating agents, there would seem to be no compelling
reason for counseling that minor data be held back, assuming, of course, that
the crucial data are convincing without the availability of minor data.
Probably the most important factor to keep in mind while considering
steps that might be taken with regard to cooperation is timing. Depending on
developments in the case, what might be a reckless step on the part of the
taxpayer or his adviser if taken at one stage of the investigation could become
a sound act if done at a later stage. For example, while the giving of a sworn
statement capping the investigation may be good strategy on the part of the
sideration. It has the further advantage that when the criminal aspects of the case have

been closed, either through a recommendation of no prosecution or after the criminal conviction, the material, or probably a good part of it, can be used in the civil fraud case as well.
"This thorough type of preparation may well be used in any tax case. But it should
certainly be applied in any fraud case no matter how commenced. The question of wilfulness or intent to evade tax can only be ascertained from an exhaustive analysis of all the
facts and a correct appraisal of the law. The question of intent is probably one of the most
subtle in the entire field of taxation. It can never be analyzed by pure speculation. As much
-as possible the taxpayer's intent must be supported by tangible facts, documented material,
and objective testimony of third parties.
"Finally, civil fraud penalties may be asserted at any time during a civil case. This again
makes it important that the taxpayer's counsel know his case exhaustively, lest he unwarily
subject the taxpayer to civil fraud penalties not originally contemplated." Id. at 276-77
(footnotes omitted).
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taxpayer after his adviser fully understands the case and has the defensive
position well in mind, the same step could be most damaging if taken at the
very beginning of the investigation. Similarly, attaching an affidavit executed
by the taxpayer to his attorney's supporting memorandum at the level of the
Regional Counsel after all the "cards are on the table" may be safe and useful, while to do so at an earlier stage of the proceedings could well be disastrous.
It would be unusual indeed that some act of cooperation on the part of the
taxpayer or his adviser at some time during the long process of a tax-fraud investigation would not be in the best interest of the taxpayer. The extreme
danger, which must be recognized by both the taxpayer and his counsel, lies
in discussing the case with the investigators or making damaging admissions
before the adviser fully understands the situation and all its implications. 19
The decisions regarding whether, when, and to what extent to cooperate
should be evaluated by the taxpayer's attorney. 20 In the last analysis, however,
the basic decision whether to cooperate should be that of the client himself.
In this connection, of course, it must be remembered that taxpayers, like
other human beings, differ widely; there are the weak and the strong, the
19. "It may occasionally be better to defer full cooperation to a later stage in the administrative process. The persons reviewing the file are always ready to receive new material and even to listen to the taxpayer's story if it is later decided that he should submit
to questioning. Sometimes, if it appears that the agent has made up his mind and cannot
possibly be persuaded to change it, it is better to wait until the case reaches . . . the Department of Justice before submitting additional material or revealing the taxpayer's explanation. Bear in mind also that the theory of the defense may be much more effective if revealed for the first time at trial. If the case is certain to be prosecuted anyhow, it may be
better to save your ammunition for the courtroom. The prosecution gains with each disclosure. A weak or unconvincing explanation, which commits the taxpayer to a certain theory
of defense, is much worse than no explanation at all." Platt, supra note 10, at 1313-14.
Another ramification of the timing aspect of cooperation is indicated by Cutler:
"This writer has in almost all instances of criminal cases submitted a copy of his complete
memorandum with photostats of all documented material to the Government representatives.
This serves the purpose of bringing the case into the open where the Government representatives will discuss their own theories on the case. The issues can then be more carefully drawn and questions of wilfulness or an intent to defraud more keenly considered.
The memorandum serves the further purpose of putting into the record the taxpayer's side
of the case, as well as that of the examining agents. The taxpayer's arguments are thus less
likely to be lost in a final review of the case.
"Where does one draw the line between refusing to cooperate and the submission of
the memorandum here discussed? The difference lies in the fact that blind cooperation can
prove disastrous. However, an intelligent analysis which properly clarifies all issues and
areas may prove the salvation of the taxpayer. These are two entirely different considerations, although both have the essence of cooperation. In any event, the chances are that the
taxpayer cannot forever sit back and do nothing. The investigatory powers and abilities of
the Internal Revenue Service are substantial. The failure on the part of the taxpayer to act
at some point may finally bring him to the end he wishes most zealously to avoid. Intellect
must be met with the intellect and good judgment must be wisely and carefully utilized."
Cutler, supra note 18, at 277.
20. There is great danger in such an evaluation being made by the taxpayer's adviser
if he is an accountant, since he would not be trained in weighing the probative effect of
evidence or in appreciating the impact of action or inaction by the taxpayer in the total
investigative process, including the ultimate recommendation of the agents.
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timid and the courageous, the "settling" ones and the "litigating" ones. The
adviser can only advise. He can and should point out the constitutional rights
and obligations of the government, the taxpayer, and third persons with
whom the taxpayer has dealt; he can and should discuss the constitutional
privileges that clothe the client; he can and should discuss the result that
would flow from one course of action rather than another. But unless he is
given carte blanche to make decisions for the taxpayer, the ultimate choice of
what course of action to pursue should be left to the client. And where the
adviser is not certain that he has successfully conveyed his opinions to the
client or that the client clearly understands the consequences of a particular
course of action, the adviser should make sure his advice is put in writing.21
Just as it is possible for a taxpayer's authorized representative effectively
to waive the taxpayer's own constitutional rights, 22 it is also possible for the

representative to lead him down the road to "cooperation" even if the taxpayer does not desire this course of action. No knowledgeable practitioner
denies the value of the services of a competent accountant at some stages of a
tax-fraud investigation. 23 However, there is real danger when the accountant
undertakes action in areas beyond his training and ken. If an accountant
misguidedly prepares net worth statements or other incisive data and, in an
effort to "settle" the controversy with the investigating agents, makes incriminating documentation available to them, his cooperation will bind the taxpayer even without the taxpayer's express authorization of this course of
action. 24 Similarly, if, at conferences along the line, the taxpayer's attorney
makes damaging admissions against the best interests of his client, the taxpayer will be bound by them. 2 5 Such activities by the attorney will be con21. Although such an experience would be the exception, situations have occurred
where, in spite of clearly defined indications that a program of cooperation should not take
place, the client has insisted, to his great detriment, on a program of cooperation in definance of advice to the contrary.
22. The privilege against self-incrimination may be waived by a taxpayer providing he
is aware of the nature and effect of the privilege and he voluntarily responds to questions
or submits records to government agents. Technically, in the situation where the taxpayer
voluntarily supplies information in the routine tax audit, he does not waive the privilege
because at that time there is no legal compulsion and therefore the privilege does not apply.
In either event the incriminating evidence may be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
United States v. Mackiewicz, 274 F. Supp. 805, 1968-1 U.S.T.C. 119186 (D. Conn. 1967); United
States v. Stein, 1957-1 U.S.T.C. 119580 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Stafford & Jackson, supra note 4, at
739. Accordingly, the same analysis follows when the taxpayer's authorized representative,
acting within the scope of his authority, provides information to government agents. United
States v. O'Conner, 433 F.2d 752, 1970-2 U.S.T.C. 119649 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Dolleris, 408 F.2d 918, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 19289 (6th Cir. 1969); cases cited notes 24-26 infra.
23. See United States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158, 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 119134 (E.D. Wis.
1955) rev'd, 241 F.2d 107, 1957-1 U.S.T.C. 19386 (7th Cir. 1957); United States v. Allied
Stevedoring Corp., 1956-1 U.S.T.C. 119279 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Ach, Special Problems the Accountant Faces in Rendering Good Service in Fraud Cases, 4 J. TAXATION 101 (1956).
24. United States v. Wolrich, 119 F. Supp. 538, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. 119276 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
25. Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666, 671, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 119402 (8th Cir. 1953); cf.
Massei v. United States, 241 F.2d 895, 1957-1 U.S.T.C. 119434 (1st Cir. 1957). If the taxpayer
himself attends conferences and makes admissions against his best interests, they will be used
against him in a later trial. Hooper v. United States, 216 F.2d 684, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. 119381
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sidered outside the scope of the client privilege.2 C
While the caveats mentioned above should be kept in mind whatever the
ultimate decision on cooperation, consideration should be given to the positive results that may follow adoption of a program of cooperation with investigating agents, which includes the following:
(1) the agents may be kept from reaching faulty conclusions as to the
facts;
(2) suspicions of the revenue agent, if he alone is on the case, may be
allayed;
(3) cooperation may tip the balance in favor of the taxpayer in a case
in which the agents are having difficulty in deciding whether to recommend
prosecution;
(4) even if prosecution follows, the taxpayer's attitude of having nothing to hide may make a positive impression on the jury if the case goes to
trial;
(5) if prosecution follows and the taxpayer either pleads or is found
guilty, the court may consider 27the taxpayer's cooperation as a favorable
factor when sentence is imposed.
Furthermore, thousands of cases go through the investigation wringer where
the taxpayers are in fact innocent of "wilful" tax evasion. If the investigation
has not involved, and if it is reasonable to assume it will not later involve the
(10th Cir. 1954); cf. United States v. Clark, 123 F. Supp. 608, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. g9546 (S.D.
Cal. 1954). In United States v. Chikata, 427 F.2d 385, 1970-1 U.S.T.C. 19448 (9th Cir. 1970),
taxpayer's attorney continued to cooperate with the investigating agents even after his full
constitutional rights had been imparted to the taxpayer. In United States v. Moon, 1970-2
U.S.T.C. 19491 (W.D. Wis. 1970), the court suppressed statements made and evidence given
by the taxpayer to special agents on grounds of active misrepresentations before taxpayer
retained an attorney but refused to suppress any evidence after the attorney entered the
case. The case illustrates the fact that where the lawyer decides to cooperate, the taxpayer
no longer has any possible argument that his action after retaining the lawyer was not
(5th Cir. 1973),
voluntary. In United States v. Dawson, 486 F.2d 1326, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. M19759
the court of appeals sustained a district court's ruling denying a motion to suppress. After
the initial contact by the special agent, at which time adequate warnings were given and the
taxpayer was told that he could consult with counsel if he wanted, all subsequent interviews
were conducted in the presence of the taxpayer's attorney. The court refused to interpret
the agent's representations during these interviews as being affirmatively false, finding it
unlikely that an experienced businessman, represented by counsel, could have been deceived under the circumstances. Id. at 1329. In United States v. Dolleris, 408 F.2d 918, 1969-1
U.S.T.C. 19289 (6th Cir. 1969), it was held that statements made by taxpayer's lawyer under
a valid power of attorney in preindictment conferences would be binding and admissible
against the taxpayer who later became a defendant in an indictment under §§7201 and

7206(1).
26. Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 19402 (8th Cir. 1958).
27. Outline suggested by Boxleitner, supra note 10, at 39. In Kohatsu v. United States,
351 F.2d 898, 1965-2 U.S.T.C. 19715 (9th Cir. 1965), relying on the reasoning of the Tenth
Circuit in Hayes v. United States, 227 F.2d 540, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 9761 (10th Cir. 1955), the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that since consideration of cooperation was a
discretionary matter with the trial court, there was no reversible error where it had excluded proffered testimony that defendant had cooperated with government agents during
the investigation. Peripherally, the court seemed not to be impressed that the matter of
cooperation was critical to the issue of criminal intent at the time of filing the false returns.
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addition of a special agent of the Intelligence Division or of revenue agents
connected with identifiable groups specializing in fraud investigations, the
adviser has a right to proceed as if criminal charges are not a substantial
threat. The tax adviser trained in such matters, having fairly evaluated all the
factors, may come to the conclusion that the government can never establish
either a deficiency in tax or the degree of wilfulness required to sustain criminal charges. If the tax adviser comes to the conclusion that the probability of
criminal action is remote and that the case will likely be settled as a civil case,
it is best to cooperate intelligently. Failure to cooperate at all may sufficiently
arouse the suspicion of the agent that he will seek the aid of other agents
specializing in the fraud area. Furthermore, if the probability of criminal action is remote but the possibility of civil fraud penalties exists, the adviser
must keep in mind that the Commissioner and the Tax Court may consider
28
lack of cooperation as a factor in assessing or sustaining the fraud penalty.
Under the circumstances posed, therefore, it would seem there is not enough
to be gained from a failure to cooperate to justify the risk.
If a taxpayer does decide to allow the agents to examine his books and
records, he must be guided by basic rules of conduct, the most- important of
which may be listed as follows,
(1) Do not tamper with, mutilate, or falsify any of the records.
(2) Do not conceal or destroy records that agents know or would know
must exist.
what the books show
(3) Be prepared to explain discrepancies between 29
and what the agents will claim the true situation to be.
(4) Do not make false statements, oral or documentary, to the agents in
an eagerness to "throw them off the track"; not only may this constitute a
separate and additional crime, perhaps easier for the government to prove
than tax evasion itself,30 but the statute of limitations for bringing tax
28. Granat's Estate v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 397, 1962-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9247 (2d Cir. 1962),
aff'g 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 171 (1960); Millikin v. Commissioner, 298-F.2d 830, 1962-1
U.S.T.C. 2f9253 (4th Cir. 1962), af'g 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1210 (1959) ....
29. United States v. Glascott, 216 F.2d 487, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. 2f9652 (7th Cir. 1954). Conversely, if a program of cooperation has been adopted on the theory that. the. taxpayer has
a good defense against a possible criminal action, then whatever leads the taxpayer has in
mind which would aid him must be given to the investigators for them to follow up; otherwise, the failure of the investigators to do so will avail the taxpayer nothing in a subsequent tax-evasion trial. Mr. Justice Clark, in the famous decision in Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 135-36, 1954-2 U.S.T.C. 2f9714, at 46,764-65 (1954), adverted to the investigators' obligation to track down leads furnished by the taxpayer which may exculpate
the taxpayer. The subject of leads is closely related to net worth cases and is discussed in
that connection. See note 16 supra and the authorities cited therein.
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§7206(l), 7207; 18 U.S.C. §1001 (1970). Representative cases
where taxpayers have gotten into trouble as the result of making false statements to Treasury
agents or filing false documents with the Treasury Department include United States v.
Brott, 264 F.2d 433, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. 129276 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 985 (1959);
Burger v. United States, 262 F.2d 946, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. 129217 (8th Cir. 1959); Smith v. United
States, 257 F.2d 133, 1958-2 U.S.T.C. 2f9719 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d
375 (2d Cir. 1956); Knowles v. United States, 224 F.2d 168, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9481 (10th Cir.
1955); Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d 386, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 29165 (9th Cir. 1953); Knisely
v. United States, 200 F.2d 559, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9227 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
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evasion charges, which usually runs from the date of filing the allegedly
false return, would start. running anew from the date of the false representation. 31
(5) Expect demands for further "cooperation." If the taxpayer turns
over his records, he is not through with the agents. It is likely they will demand that he submit to a formal question and answer interrogation under
oath. They may also demand a net worth statement or other financial data
in addition to the books and records. If the taxpayer refuses to take these
additional steps evidencing cooperation with the agents, he may well lose
the beneficial inferences he hoped to achieve by permitting access to his
records. It is rare, however, that even if a program of cooperation is
adopted, the best interests of the taxpayer would dictate that he submit to
a formal sworn statement or make available a net worth analysis. There is
no reason why the taxpayer and his adviser cannot claim that complete
cooperation had been afforded without presenting the investigators with
these potentially lethal weapons. However, it must be remembered that the
agents will insist on a statement by the taxpayer and, where a net worth
case is being "worked up," on the taxpayer's submission of net worth data.
the taxpayer's adviser
Whether these demands should be resisted presents
a2
with a difficult problem of strategy and judgment.
(6) Bear in mind that everything the taxpayer or his adviser does or
says will be recorded by the agent immediately after he has conferred with
him. Every word of these conversations will be repeated in the courtroom
by one device or another. If a statement under oath is made by the taxpayer and then on advice of counsel he refuses to sign it, such refusal will
not help him. The investigating agent will recite each question and answer
to the jury. The fact that the taxpayer refused to sign the statement after
being put on oath will, if anything, harm him in the eyes of the jury. The
government may even be successful in obtaining instructions to the jury
that the taxpayer had the duty to produce his books and records, having
once embarked on a program of partially revealing their nature and contents.3 3 Finally, the filing of amended returns or even tentative amended
923 (1953); United States v. Philippe, 173 F. Supp. 582, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. g9654 (S.D.N.Y.
1959); United States v. Eitingen, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 19863 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Sam Silver, 16 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 1181 (1957). It should also be remembered that taxpayers' advisers must be
cautious in their dealings with 1he Internal Revenue Service. Any person who wilfully aids
or assists in, counsels, or advises the preparation of a return, affidavit, claim, or other document which is false or fraudulent as to any material matter is guilty of a felony. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §7206(2). Any person who corruptly or by force or threats of force endeavors
to obstruct or impede the administration of the revenue law is guilty of a crime. INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §7212. Improper interference with witnesses or attempts to influence their
testimony in Treasury Department matters may result in proceedings to suspend or disbar an
enrolled practitioner from practice before the Treasury Department. 31 C.F.R. §§10.50-.51
(1974). See also Baiter, Combating the Government's "Back Door" Tax Evasion ChargeSection 7206(1), 33 J. TAXATION 116 (1970); Baiter, Consequences of False Representations to
the IRS: A Script for a Modern Morality Play, 10 J. TAXATION 248 (1959).
31. United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43, 1952-2 U.S.T.C. 119528 (1952); see 10
J. MFETNs, THE LAW OF FEDER.r INCOME TAXATION, §55A.15 (rev. ed. 1970).

32. For an excellent example of a situation where a conviction for tax evasion, finally
sustained by the Supreme Court, was based primarily on admissions and statements made by
the taxpayer to the investigating agent, see United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 1954-2
U.S.T.C. 119712 (1954).
33. For example, in Myres v. United States, 174 F.2d 329, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. 19275 (8th
Cir. 1949), the court made this statement: "The defendant argues that the court erred in
instructing the jury that a taxpayer who keeps books of account or records from which his
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returns, whether marked "tentative" or not, may be construed as admissions both of the amount of tax due and of fraudulent intent.34
net income can be ascertained is required to produce them at reasonable times for inspection by Government Revenue Agents, and that the failure or refusal of such a taxpayer to
produce his books and records is a circumstance which might be considered in determining
the issue of wilfully filing a false return. The defendant asserts that this instruction was
highly prejudicial because it implied that the defendant had books or records and that he
concealed them from the Revenue Agents. It is true that the defendant had no books of
account, but he did have the case files of the firm, some memoranda as to expenses, and all
of the cancelled checks upon the several bank accounts. That these were helpful to his own
accountants in reconstructing his income is apparent. His withholding this assistance from
the Revenue Agents was entitled to significance, particularly in view of his professed willingness to help them and his failure to do so. The defendant also contends that the charge in
this respect misstated the law and is contrary to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relative to self-incrimination. We fail to see how the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination was in any way involved in this case. He testified, in
effect, that he was ready, willing and able, at all times, to give to the government agents
everything he had in the way of records, but that the agents did not ask for them." Id. at
337, 1949-1 U.S.T.C. at 677. See also United States v. Ford, 237 F.2d 57, 1956-2 U.S.T.C.
U9823 (2d Cir. 1956); Strauch v. United States, 223 F.2d 377, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. f19507 (6th Cir.
1955); Beard v. United States, 22 F.2d 84, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19400 (4th Cir. 1955). For a more
complete discussion of instructions on the issue of wilfulness based on whether the taxpayer made available his books and records to the investigating agents, see note 42 infra.
34. As soon as the taxpayer or his advisers become aware that an investigation will result in deficiencies in tax, there is a strong temptation to file amended returns in the hope
that doing this will forestall civil or criminal fraud charges. There is great danger in succumbing to this temptation. An amended return, or even a "tentative" amended return, may
be construed as an admission both as to the amount of tax due and as to fraudulent intent.
In Benes v. Canary, 224 F.2d 470, 1955-2 U.S.T.C. 19572 (6th Cir. 1955), the taxpayer filed
an amended return. A revenue agent came to check personal and corporate records as part
of a field audit following the filing of the amended return. While doing this he unearthed
enough data to recommend criminal action. The taxpayer then filed a motion to quash on
the ground of unlawful search and seizure. The motion was denied. In Legatos v. United
States, 222 F.2d 678, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. f19443 (9th Cir. 1955), after the investigation started, an
amended return was filed by the defendant's accountant in 1948 for the year 1944; he also
prepared a net worth analysis which he gave to the revenue agent. After indictment and at
the trial, the government used the figures in the amended return filed by the defendant's
accountant as postulating the correct net income due. In United States v. Papadakis, 208
F.2d 945, 1954-1 U.S.T.C. f19137 (9th Cir. 1953), in an endeavor to close a fraud investigation
as a civil case and forestall criminal prosecution, the taxpayer on the advice of counsel submitted tentative amended returns clearly so marked, showing a substantial increase in the
tax due. The returns were not filed nor was any tax paid. However, at the subsequent
criminal evasion trial the government stressed that by submitting these tentative amended
returns the defendant admitted that taxes, at least to the extent indicated by the difference
between the tentative amended returns and the original returns, were due and that the
evasion was therefore wilful. It is entirely probable that the submission of these tentative
amended returns was a substantial factor in the jury's finding the defendant guilty; at best,
this maneuver in the investigation period effectively blocked the defendant at the trial from
attempting to convince the jury that a lesser tax than that indicated in the tentative amended
returns was actually due. In Baiter, Interest of Tax Practitionersin Fraud Cases on Increase,

2 J. TAxATION 41 (1955), the author states:
"What effect does the paying up of taxes and penalties by filing an amended return, or
otherwise, have on the Special Agent's recommendation as to whether criminal charges should
be brought?
"The undying impression seems to remain that the Special Agent will be favorably in-
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(7) Do not forget the rights retained after making records available.
The taxpayer can inspect his records and make copies of them while they
are still in the agent's
possession 3 5 and he may demand their return within
3
6
a reasonable time.
fluenced as to what he puts in his report vis-a-vis recommendation for criminal charges, if
the taxpayer offers to pay up indicated deficiencies and penalties (presumably fraud penalties).
"We would have to admit that conclusions based on the assumption that every Special
Agent operating in every part of the country would react in identical fashion to such an
offer may be misleading. It is entirely possible that in some local areas where the relationship between the Special Agent and the taxpayer, or his adviser, is on a very friendly basis,
and the Special Agent is not subject to immediate supervisory control, he may be very
much influenced by such a gesture on the part of the taxpayer. However, generally speaking, in the larger cities where Special Agents operate under direct and rigid supervision of
Group Chiefs, who in turn are under the supervision of a Chief at the level of the District
Director, the offer to pay up deficiencies and penalties, at this juncture, would not seem to
be of crucial importance.
"If fraud penalties are added to the deficiencies, and the taxpayer files an amended return, paying up both, the taxpayer has made a dangerous admission which later may be
used against him, in civil as well as criminal litigation. If the Special Agent feels that he
has a clear case of criminal evasion, he will so recommend, regardless of the taxpayer's
belated payment of deficiencies and penalties. If he believes that he has no criminal case,
then there is no use for the taxpayer rushing in and paying what is probably an excessive
amount of taxes and penalties. Where the situation is a close one, it is possible that the
payment of deficiencies and penalties, without controversy may persuade the Group Chief
(more likely than the Special Agent) to go along with a civil disposition of the case, which
would probably be the recommendation of the Revenue Agent who is working on the case
with the Special Agent.
"How to decide - for the taxpayer - that the case is in fact a close one obviously is a
difficult chore. And even then, if it should be decided to pay deficiencies and penalties, it
is far safer to forego the amended return route and rather to pay the money into the
suspense account maintained by the District Director, without segregating deficiencies from
penalties, so as to avoid the risk of having admitted a fraud on the revenue." Id. at 41-42.
But see United States v. Szabo, No. 2-7203 (S.D. Cal. 1958) where it appeared that almost
contemporaneously (only a few days later) with the special agent's contacting him, the taxpayer employed counsel and accountants and started to review his tax situtation. Within a
few months he filed amended returns and paid over $100,000 in taxes and interest. United
States District Judge Tolin stated that he would consider that action a voluntary disclosure
even though technically it may have been a little late. He fined the defendant $50 on each
of two counts. In United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 1971-1 U.S.T.C. 19210 (6th Cir.
1971), while an investigation was being conducted by the Intelligence Division, of which the
taxpayer was aware, he filed amended returns to reflect unreported income which was the
subject of the investigation; a revenue agent contacted the taxpayer with respect to the
amended return and did not advise him that any Intelligence Division investigation was
going on. The revenue agent testified that he had not been so informed by his superiors.
The taxpayer, on the advice of counsel, decided to cooperate fully and tell everything. A
motion to suppress admissions made by the taxpayer during the amended return audit was
granted by the district court but reversed by the court of appeals on the ground that taxpayer's admissions and decision to cooperate were voluntary and were made with the advice of counsel. The taxpayer could not later claim that he would not have cooperated had
he been told by the revenue agent that audit of the amended return might lead to incriminating statements and admissions that would be relevant to criminal action on the
original returns.
35. This may usually be arranged on reasonable terms.
36. A reasonable time for the return of records would be after the agents have photo-
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(8) Remember that, if a program of cooperation is undertaken in reliance on a promise of immunity from prosecution made by a person claiming to have the authority to grant it, great care must be exercised to see
that the promise of immunity is binding on the government 37 or at least
that, as a practical matter, the reliance on nonprosecution is justified.
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer and his adviser are strongly considering
a program of noncooperation, some possible disadvantages should be mentioned:
(1) The suspicion of fraud will be strengthened in the agent's mind.
"If you have done nothing wrong, you should have nothing to hide" is an
old maxim. The agent will have an increased suspicion that there must be
some skeletons in the taxpayer's closet, and he will be inclined to work
harder to find them.
(2) Denied the taxpayer's books, the agent may turn to indirect methods
of proving deficiencies in tax. Since a deficiency must be proved before a
criminal evasion case or a civil fraud case will stand, 38 the agent may resort
to well-recognized indirect methods of proving undeclared income, such as
net worth increase, bank deposits, cash expenditures, and unit markup.3 9
On the civil side, his determinations, when approved by the Commissioner,
will be presumptively correct, and since indirect methods of proof often
are only approximations, the taxpayer's burden of proof to show inaccuracies in the deficiencies set up by the agent becomes difficult to bear.
(3) The failure to cooperate may be an element in determining fraud
in civil cases. It is well settled that in a civil proceeding where fraud is the
issue, the failure of a taxpayer to give the agents access to books and records may be considered an element indicating fraudulent intent in the
filing of a false return.40 Conversely, a taxpayer who gives the agents full
copied whatever records they desire to keep in their file and for subsequent court purposes.
It has been held that if, by the time of trial, the government is unable to produce books
and records previously commandeered from the taxpayer, a motion to dismiss the indictment will be granted. See United States v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 867, 1957-1 U.S.T.C. 19568
(D. Hawaii 1957).

37. As a matter of law, revenue or special agents have no authority to make a personal
promise of immunity, and such promises if made are not binding on the government. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL - HANDBOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS §242.14. Cf. George H. Baker,
24 T.C. 1021 (1955). However, where the promise of immunity is made by government representatives with more authority, it should be possible to "pin down" the promise in some
binding manner. See also White v. United States, 194 F.2d 215, 1952-1 U.S.T.C. f19204 (5th
Cir. 1952); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. f19288 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
38. United States v. Schenck, 126 F.2d 702, 1942-1 U.S.T.C. 19363 (2d Cir. 1942); Glickman
v. United States, 80 F.2d 394, 1935-2 U.S.T.C. 19645 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S.
709 (1935); Duffin v. Lucas, 55 F.2d 786, 3 U.S.T.C. 1863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
611 (1932); Summerill Tubing Co., 36, B.T.A. 347 (1937). This is true, of course, only in
connection with a §7201 criminal charge; if the charge is brought under §7206(1) of the
Code, a deficiency in tax need not be proved, since the gravamen of the charge is preparing
and filing a false document with the Treasury. For further discussion on the nature of the
§7206(1) charge, see Balter, supra note 30.
39. See note 16 supra. See also Balter, Problems Relating to Taxpayer's Obligation to
Retain Adequate Books and Records for Federal Income Tax Purposes, 41 MARQ. L. REv.

107 (1957).

"40. See, e.g., Powell v. Granquist, 146 F. Supp. 308, 1956-2 U.S.T.C.

1956), aff'd, 252 F.2d 56, 1958-1 U.S.T.C.

110,065 (D. Ore.
19223 (9th Cir. 1958); William Lusk, 14 CCH Tax

Ct. Mem, 1119 (1955); and cases cited note 28 supra.
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access may win the fraud issue largely because of his cooperation. 41
(4) The agent's report to his superiors will incorporate the taxpayer's
failure to cooperate. Even though the taxpayer has the legal right to refuse
access, and even though he may be acting on the advice of counsel, the
agent probably will stress in his report the failure of the taxpayer to allow
examinations of books and records. At least at the administrative level,
this reference in the report will carry some weight in determining the issue of fraudulent intent, particularly in a close case.
(5) Noncooperation may be properly relevant to the issue of wilfulness
in criminal cases. Although subject to severe criticism as being unfair,
courts have held that a jury in a tax evasion trial may consider the failure
of the taxpayer
to turn over his books as bearing adversely on the issue of
42
wilfulness.

(6) Noncooperation generally will prolong the investigation so that it
may be necessary for the investigating agents to demand extensions of the
43
statute of limitations for assessment.
If these extensions are not given,
44
sought.
be
may
jeopardy assessments
41. Thomas A. Talley, 20 T.C. 715 (1953).
42. E.g., United States v. Pechenik, 236 F.2d 844, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. 19888 (3d Cir. 1956);
Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d 260, 1956-2 U.S.T.C. V9830 (8th Cir. 1956); Beard v. United
States, 222 F.2d 84, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 9400 (4th Cir. 1955); U.S. Aluminum Siding Corp. v.
Eshleman, 170 F. Supp. 12, 1959-1 U.S.T.C. 9160 (N.D. Ill. 1958); United States v. Long,
153 F. Supp, 528, 1957-2 U.S.T.C. 9860 (W.D. Pa. 1957) rev'd on other grounds, 257 F.2d
340, 1959-2 U.S.T.C. 9621 (3d Cir. 1958). But see United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d 8, 1962-2
U.S.T.C. 9775 (4th Cir. 1962), where a conviction for tax evasion was reversed because the
trial court permitted proof that the defendant impeded the government's investigation by
precipitating litigation as to the production of pertinent bank records, "In our opinion, this
evidence was incompetent and should not have been received. Under Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, Section 7602, 7604 . . . a hearing to test the legality of the summoned production is
afforded. The record discloses no evidence from which the jury could draw a conclusion
that Foster's participation in the test was in bad faith. That it incidentally delayed the investigation would not alone warrant such an inference. Unsuccessful recourse to remedies
provided by law should not carry a connotation different from that of successful resort ....
We merely hold that lawful resistance to investigation does not generate an inference of
guilt .
I..."
Id. at 14, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. at 86,129. See also Hayes v. United States, 407 F.2d
189, 195, 1969-1 U.S.T.C. 19204 at 83,933 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbolt, C.J., dissenting).
43. Although Internal Revenue Service policy would seem to indicate that only in unusual situations should revenue agents request extensions of the statute of limitations for
assessing deficiencies, it is common practice during an investigation for the special agent,
acting through the revenue agent assigned to the joint investigation, to ask for Form 872
approvals by the taxpayer before the investigation is closed. This request poses a difficult
problem for the taxpayer and his adviser. If the extension is given, the agents are handed
an extended period for further "snooping" (subject to, of course, the statute of limitations
for the bringing of criminal charges). On the other hand, if the extension is refused, the
taxpayer runs a risk of immediate assessment, generally giving the government all benefit of
doubt, which will force him to file a petition in the Tax Court if he is not prepared to pay
the deficiencies. See Cutler, supra note 18.
44. If the Internal Revenue Service wants to "get tough," it has a bundle of weapons
which, if not resisted, can virtually destroy the taxpayer financially. The Commissioner may
terminate a taxpayer's tax year and proceed immediately with collection, levy and distraint
procedures unless the taxpayer posts adequate security. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §6851. The
courts of appeals are presently divided on the question whether a notice of deficiency is required before collection procedures may begin after a §7851 termination of tax year. If a
deficiency notice is not required. then the taxpayer does not have access to the Tax Court
to contest the deficiency and can only pay the tax and bring suit for refund in a United
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(7) Once the decision to cooperate is made, absent fraud or misrepresentation by the agents in bringing about the cooperation, it cannot be
retracted simply because a course of cooperation was embarked on 45
by a
misunderstanding or a misevaluation of the thrust of the investigation.
Practitioners are not wholly in agreement whether the disadvantages of a
noncooperation program are outweighed by the known advantage of withholding assistance from the investigating agents in their efforts to find sufficient
evidence of deficiencies in tax as well as the degree of wilfulness necessary for
the recommendation for prosecution. 46 Nevertheless, this much can clearly be
said in support of a position of noncooperation:

States District Court, which in most cases is impractical. If, however, a notice of deficiency
must precede collection efforts, the taxpayer may stay seizure of his assets by immediately
filing a petition in the Tax Court. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases,
Hall v. United States, 493 F.2d 1211, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. g9296 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 40 (1974), and Laing v. United States, 496 F.2d 853, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. f9423 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 39 (1974), and presumably will soon settle the controversy. For
further study, see 1 L. CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRAancE §2.17 (1955). See also Clark v. Campbell,
501 F.2d 108, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 119687 (5th Cir. 1974); Peale, Termination of Taxable Year, 52
TAXES 305 (1974).
Alternatively or combined with a §6851 termination the Commissioner may issue a
jeopardy assessment. INT. Rxv. CoDE OF 1954, §6863b. Although there is conflict, the majority
rule is that the jeopardy assessment constitutes a notice of deficiency, automatically giving
the taxpayer access to the Tax Court by filing a petition which then stays collection and
seizure activities. See I L. CASEY, supra, §2.8.
Efforts to obtain a protective order restraining the Internal Revenue Service from pursuing the harassing and oppressive tactics outlined above are rarely successful if the Service
stays within the confines of statutory and interpretive law. See, e.g., Durovic v. Commissioner,
487 F.2d 36, 1973-2 U.S.T.C. 119728 (7th Cir. 1973) (when the Commissioner issues a jeopardy
assessment, there is no review by the courts, because such assessments are within his discretion
and are by nature and purpose arbitrary). In Durovic the assessment was attacked as being
wholly unfair and unreasonable. But see United States v. Baranguro, 294 F. Supp. 750, 1969-2
U.S.T.C. 19555 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (court granted taxpayer's motion for an order directing the
return of currency seized from him at the time of his arrest, holding that such action was
arbitrary and unwarranted). In Willits v. Richardson, 497 F.2d 240, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 119583
(5th Cir. 1974), the court of appeals reversed a district court's refusal to enjoin the IRS from
seizing the taxpayer's property under a jeopardy assessment following termination of the
tax year. The court recognized that normally such an injuction should be denied, but held
in this particular case the circumstances were extraordinary, since the evidence showed that
the purpose of the seizure may not have been to collect the tax, but rather to punish the
taxpayer for suspected illegal activities. See also Westgate-California Corp. v. United States,
496 F.2d 839, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 19375 (9th Cir. 1974), where it was held that when the IRS
issues a jeopardy assessment and by statute has 60 days within which to send out the notice
of deficiency, it may pursue collection and lien procedures during that 60-day period. However, in both Williams v. United States, 373 F. Supp. 71, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 119139 (D. Nev.
1973), and Rambo v. United States, 492 F.2d 1244, 1974-1 U.S.T.C. 119242 (6th Cir. 1974), it
was held that where a jeopardy assessment was issued, a formal notice of deficiency must be
given to the taxpayer, and collection and seizure activities may be restrained if pursued by
the Commissioner within the 60-day period afforded the taxpayer to file a petition in the
Tax Court. For further study, see Hochman & Tack, Jeopardy Assessments-A System in
Jeopardy, 45 TAXEs 418 (1967); Kennedy, What to do if Your Client Faces a Jeopardy Assessment or Early Close of His Taxable Year 12 TAx FOR ACCOUNTANTS 138 (1974).
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(1) The taxpayer will receive no reward for cooperation if in fact the
evidence, as the investigator sees it based on his experience and directives,
justifies a recommendation of criminal action. The earnest cooperation 4of7
taxpayer and counsel will not prevent the recommendation to prosecute.
(2) At the trial, whether by court or jury, if the evidence necessary to
support both substantial understatement of income and wilfulness is presented, the defendant's protestations that he cooperated fully will not save
him from conviction.
(3) When the investigating agents are attempting to establish the basis
for a "net worth" case, it is extremely important that they find the evidence to sustain a correct starting point and, in particular, the absence of
prior accumulated funds. Handing over to the agents admitted net worth
statements or making sworn statements on this issue is the equivalent of
or, as has been picturesquely
handing the government a lethal weapon
' '5
stated, "cooperating your client to jail."

(4) Since indications of a "hard"enforcement policy by both the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice prevail, it would
seem to be an increasingly unsafe gamble to trade one's constitutional
rights for the slim chance that the "do good" attitude of the taxpayer and
his adviser will decrease the chance of an ultimate recommendation for
prosecution, where in fact the essential elements for such a case have been
welded together by the investigating agents, albeit with the taxpayer's aid.
In addition to the previously indicated disadvantages of permitting access
to the taxpayer's books and records, access always should be refused where the
45. See discussion on waiver, supra note 22. For a case involving attempted retraction of
cooperation, see United States v. Ponder, 444 F.2d 816, 1971-2 U.S.T.C. 9522 (5th Cir. 1971),
where the taxpayer, a lawyer, voluntarily turned over his books and records to the investigating agents in what he thought was only a civil audit. After the audit became a criminal investigation, the taxpayer filed a motion to suppress, seeking to regain possession of his records. The Fifth Circuit held that suppression was inapplicable because the investigating
agents had no obligation to advise the taxpayer when the emphasis had shifted from civil
to criminal.
46. As pointed out previously, the reference is to a §7201 prosecution, which requires
proof of a deficiency in tax, an([ not to other sections of the Internal Revenue Code or to
the criminal provisions of the United States Code, which may not require proof of a
deficiency in tax. See Balter, When Should the Taxpayer Refuse to Give His Books to the
IRS?, 8 J. TAXATION 130 (1958); Lipton, The Taxpayer Under Fraud Investigation: Suggeslions for Effective Representation, 47 A.B.A.J. 265 (1961); Comment, Don't Cooperate With
IRS Agent: Reliance on Constitutional Rights Is Better Tactic, 6 J. TAXATION 293 (1957).

47. At one time the policy of the Treasury was to refrain from recommending prosecution for violations of the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue Code where the taxpayer made a voluntary disclosure of the violation before initiation of an investigation.
However, because of the difficulty of determining whether the disclosure occurred before or
during the investigation, the policy was abandoned in 1952. Treasury Department Information Services, No. S-2930, Januar) 10, 1952.
48. Arent, supra note 10. A good example of a case where the defendant practically
convicted himself by rushing in to give records and make admissions to the government
agents is found in Hanson v. United States, 186 F.2d 61, 1951-1 U.S.T.C. P19118 (8th Cir.
1950), where an increasing net worth was proved on the basis of the defendant's own books
and records, which were given to the agent during the investigation. In United States v.
Cain, 298 F.2d 934, 1962-2 U.S.T.C. 9226 (7th Cir. 1962), both a husband and his wife
were indicted for tax evasion, convicted, and sentenced to jail even though they had fully
cooperated with the investigating agents and paid all of the proposed deficiencies in tax.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1975], Art. 2
1975]

ADVISER IN TAX FRAUD CASES

following conditions concur: there is a reasonable probability that an evasion
of tax occurred (or the adviser is not certain that an evasion did not occur),
and it is unlikely that a criminal prosecution can be successful without the
taxpayer's books and records directly or indirectly supplying necessary evidence
of either the taxes due or the element of wilfulness. 49
Finally, if it is not clear whether there is more to be gained from cooperation than from noncooperation, then a program of noncooperation should be
followed until such time as the changing pattern of events or an increased
knowledge of the situation indicates that a shift toward cooperation would
more clearly benefit the taxpayer.
If the decision is made to refuse access to the taxpayer's books and records,
the principal guides for conduct should be the following:
(1) Be firm and consistent. Be careful not to offset the advantage of
keeping the books from the agents by giving them some alternative means
of achieving the same ends.
(2) Immediately remove any of the taxpayer's books and records from
the possession of those who cannot claim a privileged status and place them
in the possession of the taxpayer or his attorney. 0
(3) Beware of waiver of rights. The taxpayer must be particularly cautious not to obey a legal process served on him, whether it be a Commissioner's summons, a search warrant, or a grand jury subpoena, prior to
court review and enforcement. 51
49.

For example, in Sansone v. United States, 334 F.2d 287, 1964-2 U.S.T.C.

.9640 (8th

Cir. 1964), the court of appeals, sustaining a conviction for tax evasion, stated in essence
that if the defendant had not signed a statement which tied down the element of wilfulness, there probably would have been a reversal because the case was very close on the issue
of wilfulness.
50. The Supreme Court in Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. 2f9159
(1973), held that, unless possession in the hands of the accountant is "transitory," the fifth
amendment privilege normally attaching to the taxpayer's personal books and records will
not afford a defense to the accountant's obligation to surrender these books to the investigating agents because the taxpayer is not the person under the compulsion to produce the
records. See Note, Couch v. United States -Protection of Taxpayer's Records, 23 DE PAUL
L. Ray. 810 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: Invoking the Fifth Amendment to Avoid
the Summons -Possession of Tax Records in the Test, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 142 (1973). An
attorney in possession of taxpayer's records may resist production by asserting either the
client's fifth amendment privilege or the attorney-client privilege. United States v. Kasmir,
499 F.2d 444, 1974-2 U.S.T.C. 19655 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460,
1963-2 U.S.T.C. 2f9658 (9th Cir. 1963). For the attorney to successfully assert the client's fifth
amendment privilege, the client must be entitled to the privilege. This has caused problems
with the transfer of accountant's work papers to taxpayer's attorney during an investigation
to prevent their production by summons served on the accountant. See, e.g., United States v.
White, 477 F.2d 757, 1973-1 U.S.T.C. M19362 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d
142, 1972-1 U.S.T.C. 19268 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Riland, 364 F. Supp. 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
51. This problem has been discussed in notes 22-26 supra. See Watts v. United States,
220 F.2d 483, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. t9301 (10th Cir. 1955), where the defendant and his attorney,
when conferring with the Regional Counsel in an effort to.ialt the pending criminal case,
admitted that at least $19,987 represented unreported income. Later in the trial this admission and attendant conversations on this issue were admitted. See also Scanlon v. United
States, 223 F.2d 382, 1955-1 U.S.T.C. 19508 (Ist Cir. 1955); Cohen v. United States, 201 F.2d
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386, 1953-1 U.S.T.C. U9165 (9th Cir. 1953). A few additional observations by competent commentators may be helpful:
"There is genuine agreement among tax attorneys, I think, that no special rules apply to
the conduct of criminal fraud cases. These cases are primarily criminal cases involving taxes,
and not tax cases involving criminal law. The question is whether the taxpayer is to be
charged with a crime. His liberty, as well as his property, is in peril." Paul, The Lawyer as
a Tax Adviser, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 412, 431 (1954).
"Whether or not the courts afford greater protection to the constitutional rights of taxpayers, it is the better part of wisdom for all tax practitioners, both accountants and lawyers,
to advise their clients and follow these principles:
"1. No taxpayer should ever talk to a special agent or give him any information affecting
his own tax liability.
"2. No accountant should ever discuss with a special agent the affairs of his client without
first consulting an attorney.
"3. Attorneys should rarely permit the special agent to interview the taxpayer (even in his
presence). If it appears that a slatement by the taxpayer will close the case, submit an affidavit, in order that the exact language be carefully chosen, and the subject matter limited.
"4. Cooperation with a special agent is a 'one-way street', and should generally be limited
to formal documents, which are available to the special agent through third-party sources,
such as banks and brokers." Burns, Searches and Seizures: The Suppression of Evidence,
N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1081, 1091 (1962).
"By way of conclusion I wish to give seven pragmatic rules in the handling of a criminal
tax case at the investigative stage. Tise rules are born of the experience of many practitioners in the area, and I claim no exclusive credit for them. They have served me in good stead.
"1. Get a substantial retainer. When you are handling a criminal case, the depth and complexity of the required analysis of facts and documents is enormously time-consuming. It is
also important, as reflected in the retainer, that the client recognize the gravity of the matter.
"2. Assume your client is guilty until you prove him innocent. Not all taxpayers provide
the whole truth at the first conference. Ego, embarrassment, self-justification and reluctance
to admit guilt all tend to prevent the taxpayer from coming clean with his advisors in the
initial stage of the case. There is an implicit, underlying assumption originating in human
nature that taxpayer's counsel will be prejudiced against him if he knows his client is guilty.
"3. Forbid the taxpayer any further contact with the revenue agent from the moment
you meet him. It is a fraud case. Get the taxpayer away from the revenue agent entirely,
totally and unequivocally. Inform the Internal Revenue Service that all further communications are to be conducted through you and no one else.
"4. Obtain immediate control of all relevant documents. Any and all records, including
available accounting working papers, should be marshaled and placed with the taxpayer.
Before any summons is issued, act to secure redelivery of any records that are in the hands
of third parties.
"5. Hire a good accountant to provide assistance. The accountant must be experienced,
and he must be competent. He should be hired as the agent of the lawyer. It should be
established at the outset of the relationship that all working papers produced are the property of the lawyer, and the accountant is to retain no copies.
"6. Control the case. Make certain that all information from the taxpayer or from the
Internal Revenue Service flows through, is digested, catalogued and analyzed by the handling lawyer.
"7. Stay ahead of the investigator. Anticipate the direction of the investigation. Know
more than the special agent and before he knows it. Preinterview all important witnesses.
If their study is favorable, establish it as a matter of record with an affidavit. We all know
that witnesses are frequently subject to failure of memory or misinterpretation and that
many react in fear when confronted by a special agent. It is of critical importance to be
there first." Donaldson, supra note 10, at 122.
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